The authors encourage psychologists to transcend the simple but often made a contrast of quantitative and qualitative epistemologies by reissuing a call to consider a hermeneutical realist perspective. The authors recognize that such calls are not new and have largely gone unheeded in the past, perhaps because of how a more radical hermeneutical perspective has been conceptualized and communicated. Rooted in P. Ricoeur's (1981) philosophy of distanciation, the authors propose a dialectic of understanding and explanation that values both quantitative and qualitative methodologies by (a) tracing the philosophical development of hermeneutics as a paradigm for knowing, (b) demonstrating useful hermeneutical applications to psychology as a whole and to some specific subdisciplines, and (c) illustrating how a hermeneutic realist approach is beneficial to the multicultural study of virtue.
Humans are "self-interpreting animals" (Taylor, 1985) . That is, humans engage in hermeneutical processes of interpretation that involve making meaning out of life experience. In this article, we explore three sets of implications related to this general thesis. First, discourse about hermeneutics in psychology and social science often contrasts hermeneutics with positivistic, realist, and quantitative approaches to science. Yet, social science is inescapably interpretive. Moreover, philosophical hermeneutics comprises a diverse body of literature with a variety of philosophical assumptions. There are important differences in hermeneutical philosophies and paradigms of interpretation in both the sciences and humanities, with differing views on the definition of validity (Moss, 2004) . It is misleading to simply contrast hermeneutical or qualitative and positivistic or quantitative paradigms of knowing. We further argue that a hermeneutical realist approach to psychology can be reconciled with a valuing of distanciation, quantitative methods, and critical realist epistemologies (e.g., Browning & Cooper, 2004) . Across numerous subdisciplines of psychology there are tensions between theoretical perspectives that emphasize either objectivity or subjectivity, explanation or understanding (Hunt, 2005) . There is a converging need for moving "beyond objectivism and relativism" (Bernstein, 1983) in psychological science and practice, and a hermeneutical realist paradigm can illuminate the contours of just such a dialectical model.
Second, many hermeneutical theorists argue that how we interpret depends on contextual dynamics, particularly as we encounter chal-lenging levels of alterity or otherness. In other words, it is necessary to understand the contextually shaped hermeneutic of an individual or group to understand their psychology. This is particularly true with respect to positive psychology constructs in the areas of human flourishing, virtues, or ideals. MacIntyre's (1984) influential work on virtue ethics has offered a compelling case that virtues are best understood as embedded in particular social and contextual traditions. For MacIntyre, there are no truly generic interpretations of virtue. In contrast, Dahlsgaard, Peterson, and Seligman (2005) have argued for a transcultural approach to the scientific study of virtues and have produced evidence of some core virtues that recur across numerous cultures. We suggest that etic (universal) and emic (culturally specific) perspectives can be used in dialectical and hermeneutical tension to enhance our understanding of strengths and virtues. Subdisciplines in psychology that study strengths and virtues should emphasize the hermeneutical integration of contextual awareness with more distanciated empirical methodologies. The emerging field of positive psychology can and must integrate rigorous science with hermeneutical awareness to contribute to knowledge generation in diverse, global contexts.
Third, developmental dynamics and individual differences influence hermeneutical approaches to meaning-making. As Gadamer (1989) argued, hermeneutics is not simply a method but also is ontological. Humans make meaning as a way of being in the world. Yet, the ways of making meaning differ with human development. And the development of virtues will influence the hermeneutical processes of interpreting life (MacIntyre, 1990) .
Hermeneutical Traditions
As noted, hermeneutics as a philosophical endeavor is not monolithic, and any attempt to briefly describe hermeneutical discourse is likely to fall short. However, in this section, after defining hermeneutics, we trace two pivotal developments that helped shape contemporary hermeneutics, with a special highlight on the role of key figures in each development.
Defining Hermeneutics
The term hermeneutics is derived from Hermes, the messenger of the Greek gods, and the origin of the Greek verb hermeneuein, which means to "make something clear, to announce or unveil a message" (Thompson, 1996, pp. 360 -361) . Hermeneutics is the process of interpretation and originated during the Greek Enlightenment through efforts to understand writers such as Homer. This connected hermeneutics with the linguistic disciplines of philology, exegesis, and textual criticism (Thompson, 1996) . Interest in hermeneutics also rose during the Reformation as Protestants and Catholics engaged in a power struggle about the role of tradition in interpreting sacred scripture. Like earlier classical scholars, theologians became intensely engaged in elaborating "the rules and conditions which governed the valid interpretation of texts" (Thompson, 1996, p. 360) . By the 17th century, hermeneutics was well established as a theological discipline that developed methods of biblical interpretation (Richardson, Fowers, & Guignon, 1999) and also came to refer to the interpretive challenges in law and history.
From Authorial Intent to the Linguistic Turn: Schleiermacher, Dilthey, and Heidegger
Modern hermeneutics in the West was shaped by the influence of three key figures: Friedrich Schleiermacher, William Dilthey, and Martin Heidegger (Inwood, 2005) . First, the Protestant scholar Schleiermacher (1768 -1834) defined hermeneutics as "the art of understanding" and proposed a theory for the interpretation of texts. This involved interpreting from two vantage points: "grammatical," in relation to the language in which it is written, and "psychological," in relation to the mentality and development of the author (Inwood, 2005, p. 353) . Schleiermacher argued that texts needed to be interpreted in relation to their historical and literary context in an effort to empathically understand the psychological intention of the original author. His theory pointed to the hermeneutical circle or the circularity of all understanding as a dialectical relation between the parts and the whole, texts and contexts (Brown, 2007) .
Second, Schleiermacher's biographer, William Dilthey (1833 -1911 , extended hermeneutics beyond theological texts into understanding all human behavior and cultural products. Dilthey conceived of hermeneutics as a human science (Geiteswissenschaften) as opposed to a natural science (Naturwissenschaften). He sought an effective method for the human sciences but resisted the more objectivist epistemologies of the natural sciences, saying, "No real blood flows through the veins of the knowing subject constructed by Locke, Hume, and Kant, only the diluted juice of reason, a mere process of thought" (Rickman, 1988, p. 135) . Like literary texts, human actions need to be understood as embedded within a historical context. For Dilthey, the self is constructed through experience and forms a historically and culturally conditioned worldview (Weltanschauung) or interpretive lens (Hunt, 2005 ). Dilthey's focus was on epistemology, which contributed to an opposition between explanation and understanding.
Third, Martin Heidegger (1884 -1976 extended hermeneutics even further than Dilthey beyond a method for interpretation to the phenomenological interpretation of the human being who interprets texts. Heidegger viewed life as "a fundamentally hermeneutic process" (Nakkula & Ravitch, 1998, pp. 7) , and his non-Cartesian notion of being (Dasein) emphasized knowing through creative action in the world. Rather than understanding essences, Heidegger suggested uncovering hidden meanings and expanding horizons. Interpretations are the ways humans construct the meaning of their life experience in an ongoing process of raising new questions. Rather than asking epistemological questions about how we know, Heidegger was initially interested in the ontological mode of beingin-the-world that comprises understanding. In his later work, Heidegger (1971) moved away from ontology toward an increased focus on language, which he referred to as "the house of being" (p. 135). Rather than communicating or expressing our selves through language, Heidegger said that we are thrown into a communal linguistic process that expresses us. Language serves to constitute reality, but Heidegger dissociated the linguistic and the empirical.
The Development of Dialectical Hermeneutics: Gadamer, Habermas, and Ricoeur
Heidegger was an influential figure in the philosophical transition from modern to postmodern hermeneutical perspectives by shifting the focus from rational methods of knowing to the ontology of being-in-the-world and his later linguistic emphasis. Heidegger's student HansGeorg Gadamer (1900 advanced philosophical hermeneutics in the human sciences with an intersubjective emphasis on meaning emerging through dialogue and conversation (Gadamer, 1989) . Like Heidegger, Gadamer did not develop a specific method of interpretation but emphasized human life as fundamentally interpretive and dialogical. However, Gadamer attempted to avoid the twin pitfalls of objectivism and relativism, methodologism and nihilism, by developing a dialectical philosophy of the hermeneutical process (Bernstein, 1983; Richardson et al., 1999) . For Gadamer, all interpretation is value-laden and embedded within a tradition or "effective history" (p. 299), yet a "fusion of horizons" (p. 305) is possible through hermeneutical conversation. The horizon of an author and the horizon of an interpreter can intersect through participation in dialogue.
Gadamer also suggested that the hermeneutical circle involves two arcs: an arc of projection and an arc of reflection. Humans project an interpretation of life experience from their "forestructure of understanding." These forestructures involve prejudices or prejudgments that arise from the effective history of one's social location. For Gadamer, such prejudices are not necessarily bad or bigoted (although they could be) but simply represent the unavoidable tradition-grounded preunderstandings that shape a worldview. In this way, he differed from Schleiermacher and Dilthey by emphasizing the historical context of the interpreter. We should become aware of our prejudices, which can be revised through reflection as new horizons and forms of language are encountered. Understanding is creative as new horizons are encountered and events of truth emerge. Fusing of horizons is not a process of assimilating an alien other into a master perspective but rather "integrating another's horizon in such a way that one's outlook is changed in the process" (Richardson et al., 1999, p. 231) . In this way, our own horizon or being is transformed through hermeneutical dialogue and respectful I-thou encounters with others.
Gadamer's rejection of objectivist and inductive methodologies in the natural sciences for use in the human sciences has led some to consider him a relativist. Although he certainly contended that knowing human subjects involves different levels of subjectivity than knowing inanimate objects, he also suggested that traditions provide guidelines that constrain possible interpretations.
Jurgen Habermas (1929 -) developed his critical social theory and "hermeneutical dialectics" out of the rise and fall of Nazi Germany (Bernstein, 1983, pp. 177, 195) . This gave him greater political concern than Gadamer for the corruptive power of traditions in shaping cultural knowledge, as well as a corresponding need for critically revising the structural barriers of social institutions toward emancipatory ideals. Habermas shares with Gadamer an emphasis on the influence of our own interpretive horizons in knowing and a strong interest in praxis. However, his main social scientific project is one of specifying the universal conditions to communicative action, which leads to intersubjectivity and mutual understanding. Habermas argued that speech acts have an inherent telos (or purpose) of promoting mutual understanding through social discourse. He has been more optimistic than many postmodernists about the potential for discourse ethics to transform societies toward egalitarian justice.
Paul Ricoeur (1913 Ricoeur ( -2005 was a philosopher and linguistic scholar who developed a dialectical approach to hermeneutics in an attempt to reconcile understanding and explanation (Ricoeur, 1981) . Ricoeur built on Gadamer's awareness of historical embeddedness in traditions but suggested that Gadamer exaggerated the opposition of truth and method (Browning & Cooper, 2004 ). Ricoeur developed a unique dialectical hermeneutic philosophy that combined existential phenomenology with the more objective, exegetical, or empirical disciplines of structural linguistics. He argued for the value of awareness of preunderstandings and effective history along with critical moments of distanciation in the process of interpretation. Distanciation is not complete objectivity, but it does involve a reflective ability both to be aware of one's historical horizon and to partially detach or distance oneself from it. Ricoeur was working from the thesis that situations of speaking and writing are different, and that written texts are already somewhat distant from the author's subjective mind. In this way, texts help constitute distance and necessitate structured methods of linguistic interpretation as a moment of validation in an overall process that moves from preunderstanding to explanation to understanding. Distanciation or explanation allows a way out of the viciousness of the hermeneutical circle and can also facilitate the critique of ideology that has concerned Habermas. The hermeneutical process should not end with explanation but open into emergent meaning of the whole and selfunderstanding. Ricoeur and Gadamer agreed that interpretation culminates in practical appropriation or "making one's own" (Ricoeur, 1981, p. 185) what was formerly alien. Ricoeur (1981) also likened human action to a text that requires interpretation, and he contributed to the literature linking narrative and selfhood. Ricoeur's work offers a challenge to quantitative researchers to recognize their effective history and subjectivity in interpretation and to qualitative researchers to consider the benefit of partial objectivity through structured methods of interpretation. For Ricoeur, "distanciation is the counterpart to belonging" (p. 16). He was trying to move hermeneutics toward a more dialectical approach beyond Cartesian subject-object dualism. Toward the end of his career, Ricoeur (2004) explored the connections between neuroscience and phenomenology on the dialectical hermeneutics of memory.
Hermeneutics and General Psychology
Several books and numerous articles have applied the differing traditions of hermeneutical philosophy to general psychological research and practice, with much of this literature emerging in the 1980s. We overview not only some of the major contributions of a hermeneutical approach that apply to the field as a whole but also offer suggestions as to why, in general, hermeneutical perspectives have had such a limited influence on psychology.
Hermeneutical Theorists in General Psychology
Almost universally, this literature offers a strong contrast of hermeneutic and interpretive approaches with quantitative methods. Typically, advocates of hermeneutics in psychology vigorously critique scientism and positivism and the limits of quantitative research. For example, Messer, Sass, and Woolfolk (1988) edited a volume that addressed methodological, ontological, and critical applications of hermeneutics to psychology. They note in the preface "the editors' shared dissatisfaction with the current overvaluation of a scientistic and positivistic attitude within psychology" (p. xv). Packer and Addison (1989) also edited a volume on hermeneutical or interpretive approaches to research in psychology in an effort to challenge the traditional modern scientific assumptions of empiricism and rationalism. They argued that scientific methods are not interpretation-free and that all interpretations reflect contexts. Like Gadamer, they focused not on specific criteria for valid interpretations but the relational stance of caring and "concerned engagement" in dialogue with the research subject and the practical consequences of interpretations (p. 279; for critiques on these points, see Barratt & Sloan, 1988; Russell, 1988) . Packer (1985) also likened empirical and rational explanations to a map of a city, whereas hermeneutic interpretations are like accounts of the city from someone who has lived there.
In one of the most original psychological works employing hermeneutical philosophy, Cushman (1995) draws extensively on Gadamer and Foucault to offer a cultural history of psychotherapy in America. He not only offers a social and political critique of the associations between psychotherapy and consumerism but develops a hermeneutical view of psychotherapy as moral discourse within intersecting traditions. For Cushman, psychotherapy offers the possibility of a fusion of horizons where the therapist is able to see (albeit imperfectly) from the client's horizon while also helping open up horizons with new terrain. Richardson et al. (1999) There is a tendency among psychological writers to oversimplify the contrast between objective and subjective epistemologies and between realist and relativist ontologies. Constructivism is frequently contrasted with positivism or postpositivism as a research paradigm. For example, Ponterotto (2005) , in an otherwise helpful primer on research paradigms and the philosophy of science, describes the research paradigm of "constructivism-interpretivism" as "a hermeneutical approach" (p. 129) and distinguishes it from both positivist and postpositivist paradigms. Ponterotto associates the paradigm of constructivism-interpretivism with nonrealism, relativism, and emic and idiographic research goals. As evident from the review of hermeneutical philosophy above, this represents a fairly limited application of the diverse set of hermeneutical schools of thought. Perhaps this limitation is due to Ponterotto's focus on Dilthey, who strongly contrasted natural and human sciences, as a representative of constructivism-interpretivism rather than reviewing other more dialectical thinkers (e.g., Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas) .
A Limited Influence on Psychology
It is curious that many of the interesting points argued by Richardson et al. can be found a decade earlier in the works cited above exploring a hermeneutical critique of psychology (Messer et al., 1988; Packer & Addison, 1989) . This raises the question of why hermeneutical perspectives seemingly have had such a limited impact on the field of psychology, at least in the United States. We do not have a definitive answer to that question, but the following sections of this article explore several possible reasons and potential correctives that might make hermeneutical perspectives more broadly relevant to psychological researchers and practitioners. There are several limitations of the current body of literature applying hermeneutics to psychology that we hope to overcome. First, as a field American psychology has generally worked to establish itself as a natural science and to dissociate connections to philosophy. Integrating hermeneutical philosophy into psychology is working against a strong historical tide (Hunt, 2005) . To compound this problem, the hermeneutical philosophers that appear to be most commonly employed in psychological literatures are Heidegger and Gadamer. Both strongly resisted natural science approaches to knowing in the human sciences and deemphasized methods for validating competing interpretations. The hermeneutical work of Ricoeur is much less frequently used by psychologists. Yet, along with Browning and Cooper (2004; also, see O'Grady, Rigby, & Van Den Hengel, 1987) , we suggest that Ricoeur's notion of distanciation, emphasis on language, and dialectic of explanation and understanding offers a better rapprochement between hermeneutical philosophy and psychological science and practice.
Second, it is surprising that the American literature on hermeneutics and psychology offers very little engagement with the psychology of religion and spirituality. One exception is Browning and Cooper (2004) , although their work is more accurately located in the fields of pastoral care and ethics. The historical connections between hermeneutics and the exegesis of sacred texts would seemingly suggest valuable points of convergence for the contemporary psychology of religion and spirituality. These connections to hermeneutics are better realized in European psychology of religion (Wulff, 2003) , perhaps due in part to the geographic proximity to the traditions of continental philosophy. We suggest that the recent emergence of research on the positive psychology of strengths and virtues with the accompanying interest in meaning, purpose, and spirituality provides an opportunity for integrating hermeneutical perspectives with quality empirical science. Our proposal differs from that of Wulff (2003) , who sharply contrasts empirical and hermeneutical methods and laments the quantitative focus in contemporary American psychology of religion. However, we also suggest that differing religious communities employ differing hermeneutics (Brown, 2007) , and that positive psychological researchers will need some familiarity with hermeneutical dynamics to understand a group's construal of such value-laden constructs as virtue or spirituality.
Third, the literature on hermeneutical perspectives in psychology offers surprisingly little explicit multicultural engagement with the diversity issues of ethnicity, race, gender, class, or sexual orientation. Cushman (1995) is one exception with his attention to social class and politics, and Lee (2003) applied multicultural hermeneutics to the problem of domestic violence in Korean American families. The paucity of multicultural engagement seems like a strange oversight given the consistent emphasis among hermeneutical philosophers on historical and cultural embeddeness and the need for self-awareness of one's social context. Fowers and Richardson (1996) played into this problem by using hermeneutical philosophy to argue the controversial thesis that multicultural perspectives are indebted to Euro-American traditions and ideals, which received a vigorous critique from multicultural advocates (Hall et al., 1997) .
Perhaps one associated problem is that most of the well-known hermeneutical philosophers in western scholarship are White males, some of whom have been criticized for social conservatism and a lack of political awareness (e.g., Heidegger and Gadamer). In contrast, deconstructionist philosophers who have considered hermeneutical issues and offered intellectual fuel for political critique of ideology (e.g., Derrida and Foucault) probably go too far in undermining empirical science for most psychological researchers. Habermas, Ricoeur, and emerging perspectives in ethnohermeneutics offer better resources for a hermeneutical perspective that can resonate with the emancipatory goals of the growing multicultural movements in psychology while still valuing quantitative methods.
Hermeneutics and Psychological Subdisciplines
Our focus now turns to hermeneutical issues and approaches that have emerged in specific subdisciplines of psychology. Hermeneutical perspectives, although generally limited, have had differential impact on the various subfields.
Qualitative Research Method
Hermeneutical philosophy has been applied to qualitative research methods in a variety of ways, meaning there is not a single hermeneutical method in social science research. For example, hermeneutical perspectives have been integrated with two of the main approaches to qualitative research: phenomenology and grounded theory. Hein and Austin's (2001) study compared empirical and hermeneutical phenomenological approaches to the same qualitative interview data. These authors defined empirical phenomenology in relation to Husserl and an emphasis on the structural essentialization or description of the phenomenon of interest and the "factual data" (p. 8) or actual words used by participants. In constrast, they related hermeneutical phenomenology to Heidegger and Gadamer and an emphasis on the researcher's horizon of understanding as making a contribution to the interpretation of data that goes beyond the participant's description. it is curious that, in their comparison of these two approaches with data from a single interviewee, the authors reached considerable similarity in description.
Hermeneutic phenomenology represents a loose collection of approaches that can be found across various disciplines. Cohen, Kahn, and Steeves (2000) provide a helpful historical overview of hermeneutic phenomenology, which they define as "the tradition of looking at a phenomenon, a single kind of human experience, rather than a social process or structure or a culture" (p. 8). They also suggest that hermeneutical phenomenology is "empirical" in the sense of studying "experience based on observations rather than theory" (p. 11). This latter point about theory speaks to the issue of bracketing, that is, intentionally limiting the influence of prior interpretive assumptions when approaching data. Some hermeneutic phenomenologists emphasize a complete bracketing of interpretive assumptions (Jackson & Patton, 1992; Nystrom, Dahlberg, & Carlsson, 2003) , whereas others follow Heidegger and Gadamer in admitting that complete bracketing is not possible (Mak & Elwyn, 2003 ; also see Rennie, 2000; Sherrard, 1992) . Some promote a consensual team approach to interpreting data (Halling, Leifer, & Rowe, 2006; Mak & Elwyn, 2003) , whereas others point out the limited validity of group consensus (Polkinghorne, 1983; Rennie, 2000) . Perhaps the most significant difference is between those who conceive of hermeneutical research as achieving deeper understanding (Hein & Austin, 2001; Jackson & Patton, 1992; Mak & Elwyn, 2003) versus those who view hermeneutics more dialectically as potentially achieving both understanding and explanation (Polkinghorne, 1983; Sorlie, Lindseth, Uden, & Norberg, 2000; Wiklund, Lindholm, & Lindstrom, 2002) . This latter group cites Ricoeur and makes distanciated use of narrative and linguistic structural analysis along with many of the other phenomenologically oriented hermeneutical understandings developed by Heidegger and Gadamer. Rennie (2000, 2007) offers a unique perspective in arguing that grounded theory methodology can be considered hermeneutical. Building on Ricoeur, Dilthey, and C. S. Peirce's theory of scientific inference, Rennie (2007) suggests that hermeneutical-grounded theory steers a course that reconciles realism and relativism, understanding and explanation. His main point is that the constant comparative method of part-whole analysis in grounded theory methodology involves making inferences through abductive or interpretive "guesses" based on inductive data, and these guesses are in turn validated by further examination of data. In this way, induction can be hermeneutically self-correcting.
Hermeneutically inclined qualitative researchers differ as to whether the goal is understanding alone or understanding and explanation. However, we could find no researcher who specifically argued for a hermeneutical perspective on quantitative research, although Hunt (2005) comes close by using Dilthey's hermeneutical philosophy to suggest that all psychological research is interpreted through worldviews. Most seem to concur with Polkinghorne (1983) that mathematics involves objective precision of a different order than the interpretation required with qualitative data. Yet, quantitative analyses do involve researchers making choices at various levels about variables and methods of analysis, which makes it an interpretive process. As an example, Bayesian statistical methods assume subjective selection of a "prior" or constraint on probabilistic outcomes. Recent qualitative methods have emerged that attempt to apply mathematics to participant narrative meaning as a process of hermeneutical interpretation (Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004) . Such efforts suggest that traditional distinctions between mathematical and qualitative inference may evolve.
Social Psychology
Hermeneutical issues in social psychology are unusually explicit in that the study of social cognition, perhaps the dominant research paradigm within social psychology in the past 30 years, is precisely about how people make sense of their social world. Whereas social-cognitive researchers have focused largely on general cognitive structures and processes, many (e.g., Dweck, 1975; Markus, 1977) acknowledge that individuals' representations of social phenomena both help generate and are the product of subjective meaning.
People's interaction with their social world on the basis of the meaning assigned to events has a rich history in social psychology. For example, George Kelly (1955) contended that meaningful information in the world is filtered through a set of conceptual representations or personal constructs. The symbolic interactionism tradition in social psychology (Mead, 1934) is premised on the notion of the self-concept as imagination of one's appearance to relational others; such imagination requires a cognitive map to provide the social contours through which others and the self are evaluated. More recently, Baldwin (1992) has proposed the concept of relational schema-the notion that people develop, through the regularities they observe in their interpersonal relationship patterns, cognitive maps or working models by which they navigate their social environment. Such cognitive maps include images as well as scripts of expected interactions of self and other. For example, a senior law partner will carry working models of interpersonal scripts that constitute appropriate types of professional interaction with her junior partner; such scripts necessarily involve schemas or images of what each partner (and position) represents.
That people engage in a motivated construction of their own realities is the basis of social constructionist theory (Gergen, 1971 (Gergen, , 1999 . Gergen (1971 Gergen ( , 1999 has proposed that the logical conclusions drawn from empirical social psychology-that knowledge of the social world (including self-knowledge) is contextually influenced and therefore subject to momentary fluctuation-should cause social psychologists to question their heavy reliance on traditional empirical methodologies, especially those that depend exclusively on closed-ended self-report measures. Indeed, much traditional empirical research in social cognition and perception has documented well how "erroneous impressions tend to be perpetuated rather than supplanted, because of the impressive extent to which people see what they want to see and act as others want them to act" (Jost & Kruglanski, 2002, p. 173 ). Yet, as noted by several researchers who have reflected on the social constructionist critique (e.g., Higgins, 1992; Jost & Kruglanski, 2002; Reis & Stiller, 1992) , experimental social psychologists have reacted by tightening their empirical reins and, as a result, have become even more methodologically conservative and traditional.
There are, however, social psychologists from the experimental camp who call for a rapprochement with perspectives and methodologies outside traditional experimental boundaries. Jost and Kruglanski (2002) make a strong case that experimental social psychology and social constructionism have more similar genes that what is commonly perceived and that the rift between the two is somewhat exaggerated. Although admitting that there are contentious hurdles (such as the issue whether truth is ontologically real and to be discovered or is simply fleetingly manufactured and fickle), these authors draw on (a) the metatheoretical work of such standard bearers of the discipline as Donald Campbell and William McGuire to show how, indeed, social constructionist principles can be embraced without abandoning the experimental method; and (b) how the empirical work in such standard domains as the situated self-concept, social identity, communication, and "shared reality" can rightfully gain much by supplementing traditional methods with more nuanced approaches such as those espoused by social constructionist theory.
In a similar vein, Molden and Dweck (2006) have offered a creative alternative approach to the standard psychological focus on universal principles. Drawing from research on social cognition, Molden and Dweck propose that peoples' lay theories about the stability and malleability of human characteristics not only help create larger meaning systems but are influenced by such meaning systems as well. The meaning that is constructed through such lay theories, the authors argue, can dramatically alter such basic processes as social perception (e.g., endorsing and applying social stereotypes, engaging in lay dispositionism-the tendency to overemphasize personality traits in explaining the actions of others) and self-regulation (e.g., responding to social challenges, mastering both positive and negative transitions in life). Although they do not propose specific methodologies, Molden and Dweck stress the importance of the content of the meaning systems to which a hermeneutical approach would be especially helpful.
Developmental Psychology
Hermeneutic theory is somewhat sparse in the developmental psychology literature, with some notable exceptions (Balswick, King, & Reimer, 2005; Martin & Sugarman, 2001; McAdams, 1997; Packer, 1987; Tappan & Brown, 1992 ). Yet the field appears to be changing, with hermeneutic issues (although usually not so identified) becoming increasingly prominent in developmental theory and research through the following three approaches: narrative, contextual and ecological, and cultural psychology.
Narrative approaches. Popular within moral development (Tappan, 2006; Tappan & Brown, 1992) and lifespan development (McAdams, 1997), narrative approaches explore meaning-making through stories. McAdams' (2005) program of research in narrative psychology is particularly well developed, and he describes his work as "split between empiricism and hermeneutics" (p. 114). In the introduction to his Stories We Live By, McAdams (1997) invokes Ricoeur as a means to interpreting developmental change where personal identity is elaborated through stories that situate the self through various "life chapters." A life chapter may be a particular period (e.g., middle childhood) that employs narrative meaning-making as a response to developmental transition. Classic examples include the formation of a coherent social self in adolescence or generative wisdom in advanced age. Less conventional life chapter narratives eschew lifespan stages in favor of ongoing stories focused on existential challenges such as chronic illnesses, spiritual quests, or vocational struggles. In either case, identity emerges from socially embedded narratives that grow to function as benchmark myths in one's life. Although the word hermeneutic is not explicit in this approach, the contextual basis for storied meaning is unmistakable.
Contextual and ecological approaches. Efforts to operationally understand development in context reflect considerable challenges and complications (Winegar & Valsiner, 1992) . Does context function as an independent variable, or is it dynamically interwoven with every other variable and inseparable from them? Hermeneutic psychology implies recursive awareness or the idea that each part of the larger system affects every other part. When exploring human behavior, therefore, it is important that the researcher recognizes his or her influence in shaping the behavior of another and, wherever possible, gives the research participant a voice in explaining his or her behavior.
In his study of thought and language in child development, Vygotsky (1962) emphasized the context in which the child is embedded. Vygotsky's context was Stalinist Russia, an influence recognizable in his insistence that internal representations of reality were artifacts of external, social cues. He argued that knowledge is not constructed by the child in isolation but coconstructed in relationships with others. Vygotsky's exploration of the "zone of proximal development" subdivides the immediate from the larger context, focusing attention on "scaffolding" provided by caregivers and other adults who nurture the child's development. In contrast to contemporary psychological approaches, Vygotsky made a distinction between interpsychological and intrapsychological processes but did not differentiate between social and individual cognitive processing. Vygotsky's recognition of the importance of context, the interrelatedness of social and cognitive development, and the distinction between interpsychic and intrapsychic processes makes his theory particularly useful for hermeneutic work. We wish, however, to broaden Vygotsky's conclusions beyond language to include all behaviors.
The human ecology of Bronfenbrenner (1979) expanded several of Vygotsky's core assumptions into a distinctive systemic framework. Bronfenbrenner believed that development is precipitated by involvement in various relational contexts replete with expectations for role definition and behavior. Successive levels of relational context form a web of intercon-nected systems; these levels include the dyad (child and caregiver), microsystem (family, religious, or kin affiliation), mesosystem (connections between microsystems), exosystem (extended networks through parental work), and macrosystem (social or cultural mores). Bronfenbrenner's theory proved durable and widely influential, pushing developmentalists to consider the significance of contextual influences for individual change. Perhaps even more significant was Bronfenbrenner's observation that developmental influences include many nonpsychological phenomena. The prominence of biological factors in developmental reciprocity opens the door for hermeneutic consideration of neuropsychological and genetic development.
Cultural psychology approaches. The cultural developmental work of researchers such as Cole (1996) and Valsiner (1997) helps us understand the reciprocal impact of cultural meanings on a child's development and vice versa. If "culture is a fundamental constituent of human thought and action" (Cole, 1996, p. 2) , new methods and measures are needed to explore what this means.
Parental messages socialize children into cultural meanings (Grusec & Goodnow, 1994) . Valsiner (1997) , for example, illustrates, in an ecological analysis, the degree to which culture permeates everyday life. Valsiner deconstructs the meaning of mealtimes, suggesting that the use of high chairs in feeding American infants unconsciously teaches cultural meanings about independence and equality. Bruner (1990) argued that human behavior consists of these "acts of meaning" and that "given that psychology is so immersed in culture, it must be organized around those meaning-making and meaning-using processes that connect man [sic] to culture" (p. 12). Implicit within the use of high chairs is the moral vision that it is good to learn independence and equality. These may not, however, be values that parents would consciously wish to pursue. Consideration of the direction of development helps us realize that there are many possible trajectories and that these directions are embodied within and defined by culture.
Perhaps it is surprising that few developmental studies compare alternative moral visions of cultures. A fundamental question within cultural exploration of this area concerns the universalism and, alternatively, the cultural embeddedness of morality and values. Research using Kohlberg's (1976) model of moral reasoning generally explores universals of moral development, but Snarey (1985) , in a review of these studies, argues that moral reasoning is less universal than Kohlberg predicted. It seems reasonable to us that values may be universally shared but locally interpreted somewhat differently. In support of this, virtue research indicates that widely valued constructs such as forgiveness and taking care of another's needs can be expressed and even understood somewhat differently in various cultural contexts and communities (Cook, Orton, Norton, & Mendes, 2005; Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005; Sandage & Williamson, 2005) . A hermeneutic stance opens the possibility of exploring universality and cultural embeddedness without necessarily favoring either perspective.
Psychoanalysis
Despite Freud's positivistic leanings via his emphasis on a biological drive, Ricoeur's (1981) "semantics of desire" (p. 7) suggested a dialectical and hermeneutical reading of Freud as offering a "mixed discourse" of both subjective meaning and biological drive. Ricoeur (1970) also described Freud, Nietzsche, and Marx as all advocating a "hermeneutics of suspicion" that works to unmask false consciousness and disguised symbolic meanings. Indeed, although hermeneutical perspectives also have been employed in other clinical disciplines (e.g., clinical psychology, family therapy, social work), hermeneutical interest appears most pronounced among psychoanalytically inclined theorists. Although few theoreticians would probably classify themselves as hermeneutical psychoanalysts, many would admit to being highly influenced by hermeneutical perspectives through postmodernism, social constructivism, narrative theory, and continental philosophy. Although it is dangerous to try to propose a set of criteria that makes one a hermeneutical psychotherapist, it may be safe to assume that most of these thinkers endorse some if not all of the following: (a) Psychoanalysis is primarily an interpretive activity (e.g., persons as texts) oriented toward the construction of narrative truth rather than historical fact (Spence, 1982) ; (b) psychoanalysis is more a human science oriented toward understanding than a natural science of explanation; (c) subjective and contextual factors influence meaning-making horizons for both the client and therapist (Cushman, 1995) ; and (d) psychoanalysis is a dialogical, intersubjective, and relational process of coconstructing meaning (Saks, 1999) . Jung (1916 Jung ( /1920 ) may have been the first psychoanalyst to actually describe his approach as hermeneutical. Jung was less oriented toward Freudian suspicion of the symbol than an appreciation for symbol and actually "adding more analogies to that already given by the symbol" (pp. 468 -469; also, see Beebe, 2004) . Among more contemporary hermeneutical psychoanalysts, Schafer (1992) suggests discarding Freud's outdated natural science-based metapsychology but retaining Freud's clinical theory, which can be helpful for understanding psychological phenomenon in terms of narrative. Schafer also emphasizes the hermeneutical and worldview theme of context (Hunt, 2005) , and he views the therapy process as reconstructing meaning through the client-therapist dialogue. Fayek (2004) also views psychoanalysis as a hermeneutically reconstructive process and makes a unique contribution by drawing parallels to religious hermeneutics in Islam.
The contemporary theoreticians who are arguably the most explicit about their hermeneutical leanings are the Intersubjectivists (Stolorow, Atwood, & Orange, 2002) . Although there are several prominent theoreticians use the term intersubjective (all in different ways), these researchers provide an "Alternative Metaphysics Model" (Saks, 1999) by arguing that there is no unmediated access to reality. Stolorow et al. (2002) reject what they call the "myth of the isolated Cartesian Mind" in favor of intersubjectivity, which purports that experiences and reality are always and only coconstructed from the particular relational fields that one is in.
Although difficult and potentially erroneous to synthesize these thinkers, it appears that many clinicians are moving, with far-reaching implications, toward a perspectival realism or hermeneutic pragmatism (Orange, 1995) . For example, therapists sometimes now speak of the experiences their patients report as being both given and made. Hermeneutics has also opened a new way for therapists to understand their contribution to the therapeutic dyad. The therapist is always and only an interpreter of the patient's experience. The analyst does not sit in some distant objective place from which she can see the "truth," but she too brings her subjectivity to the hermeneutical task. Understanding is therefore always a dialogic event (Stern, 2003) and a relational or intersubjective experience created in particularity based on each unique interpersonal field (Stolorow et al., 2002) .
Hermeneutical psychoanalysis, however, does not have to fall into a kind of antiscientific, epistemological nihilism (Sorenson, 2004) . Some hermeneutical psychoanalysts can accept a critical realist epistemology that there is a real event (e.g., experience) to be known but still believe that the event will always involve subjective interpretation. This implies that what is created between the patient and the analyst is really only an approximation of the real thing (Schafer, 1983; Stern, 1997) . It is also noteworthy that Saks (1999) excluded Habermas and Ricoeur from her review, despite referring to them as "the seminal psychoanalytic hermeneuts" (p. 6). Although much of the hermeneutical literature in psychoanalysis focuses on understanding, the dialectical hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Habermas suggest ways of reconciling understanding and explanation within clinical practice. Scholars in the emerging field of interpersonal neuroscience are working toward integrating psychoanalytic theories of relational development with scientific research on brain functioning (Schore, 2003) , which offers intriguing possibilities for hermeneutical psychology of both meaning and embodiment (Ricoeur, 2004) .
The Contours of a Hermeneutical Realist Paradigm in Psychology
The sophisticated debates of hermeneutical philosophy in religious discourse have served to generate some rather unique, dialectical approaches to hermeneutics that attempt to integrate realist and constructivist perspectives. Theological ethicist Don Browning (2003; Browning & Cooper, 2004) has developed an approach to interdisciplinary research he calls hermeneutic realism (p. 319). Browning builds on the hermeneutics of Gadamer (1982) , Ricoeur (1981) , Bernstein (1983) , and Habermas (1971) in calling for awareness of contextual preunderstandings and effective history but also in valuing the place of distanciation. Browning (2003) explains, Hermeneutic realism . . . acknowledges that all understanding-including scientific understanding-is historically and linguistically shaped. But it also holds that it is possible, through various methodological maneuvers, to gain degrees of what Ricoeur calls "distanciation" (1981, 64 -65) . The concept of distanciation is Ricoeur's happy substitute for the positivist concept of objectivity. The idea of objectivity holds that understanding must begin with a cognitive self-emptying of one's prejudices and, through controlled experiment, conclude with objective propositions of states of affairs. Hermeneutic realism argues against the possibility of these positivistic assumptions about objectivity but contends that the inquirer can gain enough distance from his or her historically conditioned beginning point to achieve glimpses of the stable structures of reality (kinds of regularities within the human and natural world), even though one can never grasp them completely unsullied by culturally and historically shaped prejudgments. (p. 319) For Browning, hermeneutical realism offers a dialectical approach that moves back and forth between understanding and explanation. Following Bernstein (1983) and Ricoeur (1981) , Browning interprets Gadamer's dialogical or conversational hermeneutic as including a place for limited distanciation that allows for "degrees of approximation to reality" (p. 319). This makes hermeneutical realism similar to critical realism (Hathaway, 2002) but with a stronger contextual awareness that "knowledge is constructed in some sense" (p. 319). Browning also makes use of the critical hermeneutics of Habermas to challenge social practices that become oppressive, which offers a sociopolitical perspective often lacking in versions of critical realism. Hermeneutical realism offers a perspective "beyond relativism and objectivism," to use the title of Bernstein's (1983) book. Browning et al. (2000) use a hermeneutical realist approach to social science research, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative methods in studying the relationship between religion and family dynamics in the United States. Grassie (1994) offered a model of interdisciplinary scholarship that parallels and complements Browning's by extending Ricoeur's hermeneutical philosophy to the biophysical sciences, arguing that nature can be likened to a text and science to a reader. When any of us attempt to read the text of nature, we do so with prejudgments due to our own biophysical belongingness with nature. Grassie develops indirect or metaphoric realism as a hermeneutical paradigm for reconciling realist and constructivist approaches to the natural sciences. In the following section, we outline the contours of a hermeneutical realist paradigm for psychology.
Hermeneutical philosophy offers the intellectual resources to move beyond a particular method of social science research or therapeutic practice. Browning's approach to hermeneutical realism outlines the philosophical contours for a social science research paradigm. A paradigm has been defined as a "set of interrelated assumptions about the social world which provides a philosophical and conceptual framework for the organized study of that world" (Filstead, 1979, p. 34) . Denzin and Lincoln (2000) similarly defined a paradigm as "the net that contains the researcher's epistemological, ontological, and methodological premises" or "an interpretive framework" (p. 19). To our knowledge, the implications of Browning's hermeneutical realist approach have not been applied to a research paradigm in psychology. As mentioned above, previous applications of hermeneutics to psychology have tended to advance strong versions of constructivism or to simply undervalue distanciation. We consider some of the practical implications of hermeneutical realism.
The Inescapability of Interpretation
All social science research methods involve interpreting data. In this sense, all social science research is hermeneutical (Hunt, 2005) . Quantitative methods in psychology involve transforming human actions into numerical data for analyses, but this still requires interpreting the meaning of the data and the results. The ubiquity of interpretation does not necessitate that all interpretations are equally valid or beneficial. Schwandt (2000) uses the term strong holism in reference to the position that there is no way to arbitrate interpretations. Hermeneutical realism is consistent with a weak holism that seeks to identify effective methods and normative criteria for preferable interpretations, even if the hermeneutical process is understood as ongoing.
Reality as Discovered and Constructed
Psychological researchers frequently debate the merits of realist versus constructivist views of ontology (or the nature of reality and being). A more limited number of psychologists and psychoanalysts have articulated dialectical perspectives that view reality as both discovered and constructed by humans, a view that resonates with hermeneutical realism (Bernstein, 1983; Gadamer, 1989; Ricoeur, 1981) . Stern (1997) invokes Winnicott's (1971) dialectical view of development as both given and made: "Any experience is sometimes given, sometimes made, depending on how and when we look at it" (p. 3). Richardson et al. (1999) offer a similar dialectical perspective in explaining Heidegger's ontological hermeneutics: "Our nature or being as humans is not just something we find (as in deterministic theories), nor is it something we just make (as in existentialist and constructionist views); instead, it is what we make of what we find" (p. 212).
Systems theorists Maddock and Larson (1995) also offer a dialectical model, contending "humans simultaneously perceive and create their own experiences" (p. 107). Mental maps or interpretations of experience are shaped by both internal neuropsychological processes and external social dynamics. Human representational maps are thus "continuously transformed by shared social experiences" (p. 109). Cushman (1995) takes the Gadamerian or dialogical view of reality as coconstructed: "There is a very subtle and complex dialectic at work in human life: the world we are thrown into constructs us and then we must continually reconstruct it" (p. 310). These hermeneutical realist or dialectical views of reality as both discovered and constructed differ from many of the onesided constructivist views of some who have applied hermeneutics to psychology (e.g., Gergen, 1994).
Understanding and Explanation
A hermeneutical realist paradigm for psychology could also provide a framework for valuing the dialectic of understanding and explanation that was central to Ricoeur's hermeneutic. Grassie (1994) contends that "Explanation corresponds to analytic thinking in science, whereas understanding corresponds to inferential, synthetic thinking. In explanation, the reader stands intentionally at a distance in order to objectify the text, to analyze linguistic patterns and structures, as well as the historical, social, and psychological contexts which gave rise to a text" (p. 105). For Ricoeur (1981) , "understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures which precede it and accompany it" (p. 220). Figure 1 depicts the ongoing hermeneutical process in Ricoeur's model, which moves from preunderstanding to distanciated explanation to deeper understanding or comprehension and appropriation (also, see Grassie, 1994, p. 108) . As stated earlier, appropriation involves personalized interpretive understanding and application or "making one's own" what was formerly alien. This can lead to revised understanding as the hermeneutical process continues to evolve.
Psychological researchers and practitioners often become divided over emphasizing either explanation or understanding. Quantitative researchers tend to focus on explanation of parts, Grassie, 1994 , based on Ricoeur, 1981 whereas qualitative researchers herald understanding wholes. Clinicians preferring explanation often celebrate empirically supported treatments and clear diagnostic taxonomies, whereas understanding-oriented clinicians resonate with humanistic, narrative, and systems therapies. A dialectical approach calls into question these oppositions.
The implications for psychological research involve a valuing of both quantitative and qualitative methods. This could include the dialectical approach to mixed methods research that intentionally uses competing research paradigms, such as postpositivism and constructivism, for productive triangulation (Hanson, Creswell, Clark, Petska, & Creswell, 2005 ). Another approach is to use both quantitative and qualitative methods in an overall program of research but not in the same study.
Quantitative and qualitative methods obviously rest on differing criteria for validity. However, a unique feature of Ricoeur's model and a hermeneutical realist approach compared with other hermeneutics is the place for clarifying standards of validation. Moss (1994 Moss ( , 2004 has argued for the benefits of differing types of validity in educational assessment and testing, including psychometric and hermeneutic approaches. One of her more interesting points is that a hermeneutical perspective suggests validity can ultimately be enhanced through interrater disagreement if it leads to productive self-reflection and dialogue. Thomas Kuhn's (1970) controversial work The Structures of Scientific Revolutions challenged the positivist paradigm in science by arguing that observations of data are actually theory-laden and that scientific advances are situated within the ontological priority of historical contexts. Kuhn contributed toward an emphasis in postpositivist philosophy of science on the hermeneutical themes of understanding and interpretation (Bernstein, 1983) . In a later work, Kuhn (1977) refers to hermeneutics by observing What I as a physicist had to discover for myself, most historians learn by example in the course of professional training. Consciously or not, they are all practitioners of the hermeneutical method. In my case, however, the discovery of hermeneutics did more than make history seem consequential. Its most immediate and decisive effect was instead on my own view of science. (p. xiii) Kuhn suggested that scientists typically approach data influenced by the governing paradigms of their historical period. This is similar to Gadamer's (1989) notion of prejudgments. Kuhn has been widely critiqued for his social constructionist view of science, which deemphasizes ontology and suggests that pragmatism is the only criterion for scientific validity. Nevertheless, Kuhn exerted a major influence on the philosophy of science by arguing for the relevance of the sociology of knowledge.
Sociology of Knowledge
The sociology of knowledge also offers a useful framework for a hermeneutical realist paradigm by drawing attention to the social embeddedness and disciplinary matrices of psychological discourse (Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Cushman, 1995; Kuhn, 1970 Kuhn, , 1977 . Psychological researchers typically participate in multiple social networks that exert influences on knowledge generation and legitimization. Funding bodies, tenure committees, journal editors, peer reviewers, and participants are only a few of the social agents that help shape the research of psychologists. Practitioners are likewise influenced by their professional communities or networks, including supervisors, licensing bodies, insurance companies, agencies, and professional organizations. Mentors, colleagues, students, and clients offer even more personal levels of social influence on researchers and practitioners.
Psychologists cannot avoid being influenced by traditions and the limitations of social contexts. In fact, hermeneutical philosophers like Gadamer and Ricoeur suggest that traditions are both helpful and limiting for knowledge generation. But a hermeneutical realist paradigm can also serve to emphasize self-awareness of one's personal and professional contexts and traditions and the accompanying sources of bias. Moreover, psychologists might reflect on the levels and types of diversity within those contexts and traditions and the ways in which limits on certain types of diversity might influence interpretive processes.
A Hermeneutical Realist Psychology of Virtue
We illustrate some of the benefits of a hermeneutical realist paradigm by considering the psychology of virtue. Martin Seligman heralded the positive psychology movement during his term as president of the American Psychological Association to encourage scientific research on human strengths and virtues (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) . Researchers in various subdisciplines in psychology and other social sciences had been studying human strengths for decades; however, Seligman did help galvanize and organize a more explicit positive psychology research movement. Peterson and Seligman (2004) developed a taxonomy of strengths and virtues to overcome the postWorld War II focus on pathology in psychology. The positive psychology movement has helped generate an excellent body of research on virtues, mostly involving postpositivist paradigms and quantitative methods. We would like to see more of this. However, we also want to suggest ways that a hermeneutical realist paradigm can deepen and diversify the quality of psychological research and practice related to virtues.
Defining Virtue
In both philosophy and contemporary psychology, virtues are generally understood as embodied traits of character, not simply moral behaviors, values, or principles (Sandage & Hill, 2001) . McCullough and Snyder (2000) suggest that character represents the structure of the human psyche that results from life experience, and virtues represent specific expressions of a person's character. Virtues are qualities or strengths of human development and excellence that enhance the capacity to flourish and live life well, to live "the good life" (Meara, Schmidt, & Day, 1996) . A virtue-oriented approach in psychology can provide a helpful complement to the more cognitive and individualistic approaches to moral development (Cawley, Martin, & Johnson, 2000) . Many cultural and religious traditions also promote virtues like forgiveness as expressions of spirituality with sacred meaning (Rye & Pargament, 2002) .
The differences between the terms strength and virtue appear to still be unclear in positive psychology literature and are used somewhat interchangeably. Peterson and Seligman (2004) outlined seven criteria they use for their taxonomy of strengths or virtues. To be considered a strength/virtue, a construct must be (a) traitlike, (b) valued in its own right rather than simply as a means to other ends, (c) commonly desired by parents for their children, (d) cultivated and ritualized by social institutions, (e) exemplified in real or mythical cultural role models, (f) exemplified in prodigies who demonstrate significant levels of the strength or virtue, and (g) valued almost universally. Sandage and Hill (2001) also articulated an outline of the construct of virtue by drawing on moral philosophy and recent social science research related to virtue. In contrast to Peterson and Seligman (2004) they were not trying to identify specific criteria for a construct to be considered a strength or virtue. Rather, they suggested six dimensions for the definition of virtue. These include the understanding that virtues (a) integrate ethics and health, (b) are embodied traits of character, (c) are sources of human strength and resilience, (d) are embedded within a cultural context and community, (e) contribute to a sense of meaningful life purpose, and (f) are grounded in the cognitive capacity for wisdom.
Virtues as Descriptive and Prescriptive
Discourse on virtues in both philosophy and psychology tends to move back and forth between descriptive and prescriptive functions. Virtues can be viewed as both prescriptive ideals (e.g., striving to be humble as an ideal of human functioning) and embodied states and traits (e.g., present level of humility as an individual differences state and trait). A hermeneutical realist perspective in social science suggests that there is an inherent dialectical tension between description and prescription that cannot be completely collapsed (Browning & Cooper, 2004) . Hermeneutical critics of positivism in psychology frequently argue that there are often unacknowledged moral and cultural assumptions embedded in psychological theories and models of therapy (Cushman, 1995; Richardson et al., 1999) . Quantitative researchers reply that without descriptive empirical data to validate models and theories, at least partially, it is difficult to know whether ideals or prescriptions are worth supporting. Ricoeur's (1986) Lamb (2002) has argued that a valorizing of forgiveness can become oppressive in certain contexts for women and others if there is an imbalance of social power. In a related vein, Flanagan (1991) offered a critique of Kohlberg's theory of moral development for not adequately bringing theoretical formulations into contact with actual descriptions of folk experiences of moral behavior. In our opinion, hermeneutical philosophy will make a lasting and substantive impact on psychology only through a more robust dialectical balancing of descriptive and prescriptive functions.
Virtue, Epistemology, and Human Development
Virtues or character strengths represent both developmental and hermeneutical constructs. MacIntyre (1984) related character virtues to narrative worldviews that are employed for interpreting life. Whether viewed prescriptively or descriptively, virtues are affected by contextual and developmental factors. And in a recursive fashion, virtues influence the processes of knowing (i.e., epistemology) or interpreting life. For example, a person who can be characterized as having a high level of trait compassion will interpret life differently from someone low in trait compassion.
In psychology, the subdisciplines of developmental and personality psychology can offer large bodies of data that demonstrate how individual and contextual differences (i.e., ontological differences) affect epistemological interpretations of life in various domains. And recursively, new experiences of knowing can restructure developmental ontology, which is a major tenet of Kegan's (1994) evolutionary model of human development. Applied to the construct of virtue, this recursive view suggests that interpretations are influenced by both contextual referents and individual factors, and that our interpretations in turn serve to constitute our being (Taylor, 1985) . This recursive model of epistemology and ontology challenges the views of some constructivists or "radical epistemologists" who have downplayed ontology.
Etic and Emic Approaches to Virtue
One point of tension in the emerging positive psychology literature is whether virtues are construed as universal or culturally embedded. An etic approach emphasizes universal categories and taxonomies (e.g., Dahlsgaard et al., 2005; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) , whereas an emic approach emphasizes cultural particularity and questions cross-cultural generalizability (e.g., Lamb, 2002; Sandage, Hill, & Vang, 2003) . Hermeneutically, etic and emic approaches to research basically map onto the categories of explanation and understanding, and these sets of interpretive stances are not necessarily mutually exclusive. It seems possible that a particular virtue (e.g., wisdom, justice, gratitude, compassion, fortitude, or forgiveness) might be universally valued, perhaps to varying degrees of priority, but is still locally embedded in specific cultural institutions and rituals (Sandage & Naicker, in press ). This would mean that virtue constructs like wisdom or courage might be expressed or even defined somewhat differently in various cultural contexts and communities but still valued in a nearly universal fashion. This is analogous to the cross-cultural study of psychopathology and the way in which symptoms of depression appear across cultures while the meanings associated with those symptoms are socially constructed in diverse ways. It may prove to be that the cultural variables that are related to differing construals of some virtues represent general worldview differences (e.g., individualism vs. collectivism) rather than more specific cultural demographics (e.g., Korean vs. Chinese). There is some evidence supporting this thesis for the psychology of forgiveness (Sandage & Williamson, 2005) . Cultural differences in the virtues could hold important practical implications for contextualizing psychological interventions aimed at facilitating various developmental virtues. MacIntyre (1984 MacIntyre ( , 1990 ; see also Dueck & Reimer, 2003) , in his widely cited philosophical account of virtue ethics, argues that virtues are embedded in traditions that provide a narrative envelope for particular taxonomies of virtue. MacIntyre does not engage literatures in hermeneutical philosophy, but he can be read as quite consistent with hermeneutical emphases on effective history and interpretive communal contexts for the social practices that form virtues. He advocates what psychologists might consider a thick, emic approach for understanding virtues as tradition-specific and particular rather than a more thin, universal, or encyclopedic approach to virtues such as that described by Dahlsgaard et al. (2005) .
Virtue Traditions
MacIntyre has been criticized for an idealistic view of traditions as coherent or unitary in human experience. Volf (1996) pointed out that most people are probably influenced by multiple cultural and religious traditions in a less unified way than might be implied by MacIntyre. Traditions prescribe ideals of how to realize certain virtues, but the actual human practice of those virtues might be achieved in various ways. One of the advantages of quantitative research on virtues is to descriptively validate aspects of differing traditions that do predict the expressions of certain virtues. However, Rye and Pargament (2002) found that it is difficult to experimentally control for the use of traditions in practicing virtues in a mixed method study that compared a religious and a secular group intervention to promote forgiveness. Qualitative analyses revealed that some participants in the so-called "secular" group condition did draw on their religiosity in working on forgiveness despite the lack of religious content in the manualized intervention. Qualitative research can also be useful for understanding thick descriptions of the psychology of virtues and the differing moral sources people draw on in practicing virtues (Taylor, 1989) . A hermeneutical realist approach can be used to work toward contextualizing virtues to fit various contemporary contexts or systems (Sandage et al., 2003; Sandage & Naicker, in press; Sandage & Williamson, 2005) .
Ethnohermeneutics of Virtue
A hermeneutical realist paradigm for the psychology of virtue can also facilitate the use of ethnohermeneutics. Geertz (2003) has described an anthropological approach called ethnohermeneutics, which uses methodological pluralism to interpret the indigenous hermeneutics or meaning construction of particular groups. But Geertz also defines the ethnohermeneutical approach as achieving an intersubjective convergence of horizons in that it attempts to locate the scholar and the people under study in each their own network of discourses, traditions, texts and meanings in the context of their social and intellectual circumstances. The result, I suggest, is a third perspective whereby the frames of reference of the scholar and the people under study are transcended. (p. 315) This includes a hermeneutical approach that makes use of (a) taxonomic and linguistic analyses of texts and other data, (b) awareness of indigenous hermeneutical practices, and (c) reflection on the researcher's own hermeneutical horizon. The study of indigenous hermeneutical practices involves clarifying the particular hermeneutic of a specific individual or group, which is necessary for understanding their virtues or ideals. An interesting example is drawn from Hood et al.'s (2005) analysis of religious fundamentalism and what is perhaps their surprising application to the Amish. What are indeed to the outsider puzzling markers of Amish life (the practice of shunning, nothing beyond an eighth grade education, eschewing modern conveniences, etc.) make sense once one understands the Amish Ordnung or hermeneutic (the orally transmitted, biblically based, and communally enforced behavioral code), the fundamental purpose of which is to protect what is perceived to be the purity of the community and to foster the development of personal character consistent with an understanding of that collective purity.
Conclusion
In this article, we challenge psychologists to reconsider a sole allegiance to either quantitative or qualitative epistemologies by examining the potential benefits of a hermeneutical realist perspective. By proposing a dialectic of understanding and explanation that values both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, we contend that the search for broad psychological principles and processes is not undermined, but rather is enhanced. Our caution is not against the search for universal principles, but like Molden and Dweck (2006) , we are concerned that without a willingness to engage the manner in which people construct and interpret their world, psychological researchers will lose "sight of the person behind the process" (p. 201). We have attempted to supplement the broad philosophical contours of a hermeneutical perspective with specific examples and recommendations of how we can maintain sight of that person.
